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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Eighth Circuit Remands Arkansas Party-Filing 
Deadline Case for Lack of Record 
Moore v. Martin, No. 15-3558, 2017 WL 1485036 (8th 
Cir. 2017). 
In a two to one decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals remanded a ballot access restriction case back to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas.  The case arose after three independent candidates 
sought declaratory judgment in response to a 2015 piece of 
legislation that moved the 2016 date for non-presidential 
candidates running in party primaries from May to March.  The 
candidates maintained that the new deadline was unnecessarily 
early and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The 
district court granted Arkansas’s motion for summary judgment 
and one of the candidates, Mark Moore, appealed. 
Plaintiff Mark Moore was an independent candidate for 
Lieutenant Governor in the 2014 election, who claims on appeal 
that he plans to run in 2018.  He originally sued the Arkansas 
Secretary of State claiming that the March deadline for 
independent candidates was not narrowly tailored to serve a 
government interest.  The district court disagreed, and held that 
“Arkansas has a compelling interest in timely certifying 
candidates and initiatives to the general election ballot.” 
Writing for the majority, Judge Roger L. Wollman held that 
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the new 
deadline was narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state 
interest.  Under the 2015 legislative changes, a person seeking to 
run as an independent candidate for any office other than the 
President or Vice President must submit the requisite signed 
petition.  These petitions must be verified by the Arkansas 
Secretary of State and county clerks.  The majority highlighted 
these and a number of other procedural requirements that 
candidates must go through before having their names appear on 
the general election in November.  The opinion also noted that 
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Arkansas’s ballot access statutes have been repeatedly 
challenged, citing cases from 1975, 1976, 1977, 1988, and 1994. 
Here, the district court erred “in concluding that there was 
no genuine dispute of material fact whether the March 1 
deadline is narrowly drawn to serve [a] compelling 
interest.”  Pointing to the Secretary of State’s evidence of a 
higher number of independent candidates who had petitioned for 
inclusion, the majority questioned whether this increase in 
nonpartisan petitions caused an increase in litigation and 
interference with the verification process.  The majority 
concluded that “the increase in the number of nonpartisan 
petitions does not by itself establish the existence of a 
compelling interest that the March 1 deadline is narrowly 
tailored to serve.”  Even if the increase caused Arkansas to hire 
more election workers to process the petitions, citing the cost as 
a compelling government interest would not likely render the 
legislative change constitutional.  The United States Supreme 
Court has held that the possibility of increased administrative 
costs does not justify a statute prohibiting a political party from 
opening its primary to voting by independents.  The decision 
elaborates on gaps in the record regarding timing, feasibility, 
and past practices.  Without more, the majority concludes, the 
lack of record precludes a finding of summary judgment. 
Judge Lavenski Smith dissented, faulting the filing deadline 
as “neither actually required nor narrowly drawn” and 
concluding that Moore was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.   
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Eighth Circuit Affirms Grant of Summary Judgment in 
Lawsuit Against Missouri Police Force Alleging 
Excessive Force 
Boude v. City of Raymore, No. 16-1183, 2017 WL 
1749664 (8th Cir. 2017). 
In a unanimous decision, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of 
Raymore Police Department.  Plaintiff-Appellee Kimberly 
Boude was arrested by Officer Michael Heady after being 
physically removed from her motor vehicle in March 
2012.  After one member of the Raymore Police Department had 
found her huffing aerosol spray cans inside her SUV, Officer 
Heady was dispatched to respond to a motorist in need of 
assistance who matched Boude’s description from the day 
before.  After Officer Heady approached her car, he spoke with 
Boude about turning her car off.  When Boude reached for the 
gearshift, her car’s brake lights turned on at which point, Officer 
Heady said “no, no, no,” reached through the front window, and 
turned off the ignition.  After taking Boude’s keys, he asked her 
to step out of the car.  When she refused, he physically removed 
her and placed her on the ground before handcuffing 
her.  Another police officer’s dash camera recorded the events. 
After Boude pled guilty to driving while intoxicated, she 
claimed injuries from the arrest alleging excessive force, 
negligence and battery.  The district court granted summary 
judgment on the grounds of qualified and official 
immunity.  Writing for the Court, Judge Duane Benton held it 
was objectively reasonable for Officer Heady to (1) believe that 
plaintiff’s reach for the gearshift was an attempt to shift the car 
to drive and to flee; and (2) believe that the plaintiff’s refusal to 
exit her vehicle and subsequent movement was a non-compliant 
attempt to possibly flee on foot.  On appeal, Boude argued that 
Officer Heady’s actions became unreasonable after he had 
already taken her keys and eliminated the risk that she might 
flee.  However, the Court found Heady could have reasonably 
believed that she “would continue to be non-compliant or 
attempt to flee on foot.”  The Court also dismissed Boude’s 
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contention that Office Boude forfeited his official immunity by 
acting in bad faith.  The Court found these conclusory 
allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
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Arkansas Supreme Court Affirms Class-Action Status 
with Exception of Negligence Claims Against Nursing 
Home 
Robinson Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. 
Andrew Phillips, 2017 Ark. 162, 2017 WL 1827824 
(unpublished). 
In May, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed most of a 
circuit court’s order granting class certification in part, allowing 
plaintiffs to proceed in a lawsuit against Robinson Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center, LLC, its owner Michael Morton, and 
related entities (collectively, “Robinson”).  Andrew Phillips 
filed the original lawsuit on behalf of his deceased mother, 
Dorothy Phillips, and later filed an amended class-action 
complaint to include other residents or estates of residents who 
resided at the Center from June 11, 2010, to present.  Phillips 
alleges Robinson’s business practice of chronic understaffing 
breached the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), 
constituted negligence and civil conspiracy, and unjustly 
enriched Robinson. 
Relying on a 2015 Arkansas Supreme Court case, Robinson 
argued that class certification was inappropriate.  Circuit Court 
Judge Timothy Fox found otherwise, concluding that the class 
definition was proper and not overbroad.  He also identified 
twelve issues common to the class members and concluded that 
these issues predominated over the individual issues.  Further, 
Judge Fox found that the class requirements of numerosity, 
typicality, superiority, and adequacy were satisfied and granted 
class certification.  Robinson filed an interlocutory appeal, 
arguing that Phillips’s case was fundamentally different from 
two previous class action appeals where class certification was 
proper.  In particular, Robinson maintained that the class 
definition was overbroad and that Phillips did not meet his 
burden of proving (1) commonality; (2) predominance; (3) 
superiority; and (4) typicality under Rule 23 of the Arkansas 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs class actions and class 
certification. 
Justice Karen Baker wrote the opinion, agreeing with 
Phillips’s contention that the arguments presented by Robinson 
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were already rejected by the court.  She affirmed the circuit 
court’s class certification as Phillips’s breach of contract, 
ADTPA, and unjust enrichment claims. Relying on the same 
two nursing home class actions, the Court upheld Judge Fox’s 
findings of commonality and predominance.  As for superiority, 
the Court noted that the class was “cohesive and manageable 
group because the common question of understaffing can be 
ascertained on a classwide basis.”  In addressing the typicality 
requirement, the Court concurred with Judge Fox, explaining 
that “the class representative’s claim arises from the same 
alleged wrongful conduct, understaffing.”  The Court also 
agreed that the class definition was sufficiently definite. 
However, Judge Baker disagreed that Phillips’s negligence 
claim was appropriate for class certification.  Under Arkansas 
law, she wrote, “negligence requires an individual analysis of 
each plaintiff’s specific allegations.”  Further, the law requires 
proof that breach of contract was the “proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injuries” and that “negligence is never assumed.”  In 
remanding the case, Justice Baker instructed the circuit court to 
decertify the class solely on the negligence claim. 
Justice John Dan Kemp authored a separate opinion, 
concurring and dissenting in part, joined by two other 
justices.  He faults the majority’s position that the class’s 
negligence claim requires an individualized proximate-causation 
analysis.  This thinking, he explains, involves the majority 
“mistakenly delv[ing] into the merits of the underlying 
claims.”  Justice Josephine Linker Hart, joined by Justice Shawn 
Womack, filed an opinion concurring with the reversal on a 
class action for negligence, but dissenting on the class 
certification for the contract, unjust enrichment and the ADTPA 
claims. 
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